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U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 
 Counsel for Respondent 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.   
  Sina Sunday petitions for review of an order removing 
him from the United States.  He unsuccessfully sought a “U 
visa” to avoid removal.  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) concluded that the immigration judge (“IJ”) lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Sunday’s request for a waiver of 
inadmissibility regarding his U visa application.  We agree 
with the BIA.  Sunday also argues that his removal is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.  Because the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that removal is not 
punishment, that argument lacks merit as well.  We will deny 
the petition for review.   
 
I. 
 
 Sunday is a native and citizen of Nigeria who was 
admitted to the United States in 1995 with permission to 
remain for a year.  He overstayed and, in 2013, received a 
Notice to Appear charging him as removable for overstaying 
and for committing certain crimes.  An IJ held Sunday was 
removable based on his overstaying and on a bail jumping 
conviction.   
 
 To avoid removal, Sunday applied for a U visa from 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(“USCIS”) (part of the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”)).  But to obtain a visa, an applicant must be 
admissible, and Sunday was inadmissible because he lacked a 
valid passport and because of his bail jumping conviction.  
Sunday petitioned the USCIS for a waiver of inadmissibility, 
but the request was denied based on his criminal record.  
Sunday then applied for a waiver of inadmissibility from an IJ 
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(IJs are part of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)).  An IJ 
determined that she lacked jurisdiction to consider Sunday’s 
request for a waiver.  Sunday also argued that his removal 
was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment, but 
another IJ (who inherited the case after the prior IJ retired) 
declined to consider that argument, reasoning that IJs should 
avoid considering “the possible unconstitutionality of the 
effect of the Immigration Act.”  Appendix (“App.”) 35.  
Sunday was ordered removed by that IJ.   
 
 The BIA affirmed both determinations.  As to the 
waiver of inadmissibility, the BIA reasoned that, per DHS 
regulation 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1), every benefit request made 
to DHS must follow the relevant form instructions.  And 
“[t]he instructions for the Application for Advance 
Permission to Enter as Nonimmigrant (Form I-192) state . . . 
that an applicant for U nonimmigrant status, if inadmissible, 
must file Form I-192 with the USCIS.”  App. 21.  Thus, the 
BIA concluded, waivers regarding U visas are exclusively 
within DHS’s authority.  The BIA added that it previously 
“held that a waiver of inadmissibility [by an IJ] cannot be 
granted in deportation, and by analogy, removal proceedings 
pursuant to [In ]Matter of Fueyo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 84 (BIA 
1989).”  App. 21.  As to Sunday’s argument regarding 
unconstitutional disproportionality, the BIA held that both it 
and the IJ lacked authority to rule on the issue.  Id.  Sunday 
timely petitioned for review.    
 
II. 
 
 The BIA had jurisdiction to hear Sunday’s appeal 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  We have jurisdiction over 
Sunday’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review 
legal conclusions of the BIA de novo.  Roye v. Attorney Gen. 
of U.S., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
III. 
 
The questions before us are (1) whether the IJ had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Sunday’s request for a waiver of 
inadmissibility and (2) whether Sunday’s removal was 
unconstitutionally excessive punishment.  The answer to both 
questions is no.     
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A. 
 
U visas allow noncitizen victims of certain crimes who 
have suffered “substantial physical or mental abuse,” and who 
are likely to be helpful in investigating the crime, to remain in 
the United States as lawful temporary residents.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(U).  The decision whether to grant a U visa is 
statutorily committed to DHS, and exercised through USCIS.  
Only 10,000 U visas are available annually.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(p)(2)(A). 
 
 A noncitizen who seeks a U visa, but who is 
inadmissible for any number of reasons, must obtain a waiver 
of inadmissibility in order to become eligible for the visa.  8 
C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(3)(i).  Sunday is inadmissible due to his 
lack of a valid passport and his bail jumping conviction.  He 
seeks a waiver.  It is undisputed that DHS has the authority to 
grant a waiver of inadmissibility for the purposes of a U visa 
application: 
 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
determine whether a ground of inadmissibility 
exists with respect to a nonimmigrant described 
in section 1101(a)(15)(U) of this title.  The 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in the 
Attorney General’s discretion,1 may waive the 
application of subsection (a) of this section 
[outlining grounds for inadmissibility] . . . in the 
case of a nonimmigrant described in section 
1101(a)(15)(U) of this title, if the Secretary of 
Homeland Security considers it to be in the 
public or national interest to do so. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).  Sunday sought a waiver from USCIS 
and was rejected.       
                                              
1 The reference to “Attorney General’s discretion” appears to 
be an error by the codifier.  L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022, 
1025 (7th Cir. 2014); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182 n.4.   
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 There is also, however, a separate waiver provision in 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d), which concerns not DHS but the 
Attorney General: 
 
[A]n alien . . . who is inadmissible under 
subsection (a) of this section [outlining grounds 
for inadmissibility] . . . but who is in possession 
of appropriate documents or is granted a waiver 
thereof and is seeking admission, may be 
admitted into the United States temporarily as a 
nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney 
General.  The Attorney General shall prescribe 
conditions, including exaction of such bonds as 
may be necessary, to control and regulate the 
admission and return of inadmissible aliens 
applying for temporary admission under this 
paragraph.   
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) (often referred to, as we do 
below, by its corresponding designation in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 
Stat. 163, 187 (1952)).2  Sunday claims that, under this 
provision, the Attorney General — and ultimately, through 
delegation, an IJ — has the authority to issue him a waiver of 
inadmissibility.  We disagree. 
 
 Section 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act gives the Attorney General the discretion to 
grant a waiver of inadmissibility to aliens who are “seeking 
admission.”  “Admission” is defined as the “lawful entry of 
the alien into the United States after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).  Accordingly, the phrase “and is seeking 
admission” unambiguously indicates that applications for 
waivers from the Attorney General are limited to those 
                                              
2 The statutory language at issue in this case was previously 
located in § 212(d)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.  An amendment to the Act in 2005 relocated the 
provision in its current form to § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii).  See 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-13, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309 (2005).     
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seeking lawful entry.  By definition, that group does not 
include individuals who have already lawfully entered.  See 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“The 
distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into 
the United States and one who has never entered runs 
throughout immigration law.”).  And the succeeding sentence, 
which gives the Attorney General “the power to set 
conditions on admission for those applying for entry,” also 
“demonstrates that the statute’s drafters had in mind a waiver 
applicant who is not yet admitted.”  Borrego v. Mukasey, 539 
F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2008) (adopting this interpretation).   
 
In addition to this statutory circumscription on the 
scope of § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) waivers, IJs may only “exercise 
the powers and duties delegated to them . . . by the Attorney 
General through regulation.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).  And, as 
outlined below, DOJ’s immigration regulations restrict the 
IJ’s § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) waiver jurisdiction to instances where 
a waiver request was first made to a district director (who is 
part of DHS) prior to an individual’s arrival in the United 
States.     
 
All aliens who arrive at the United States must be 
inspected by immigration officers for admissibility.  8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1225(a), (b).  Just as with a U visa applicant already in the 
United States, arriving aliens who are inadmissible must 
obtain a waiver.  DOJ regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1212.4(b) 
describes the application process for the § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) 
waiver provision at issue in this appeal.  The regulation is 
entitled, “Applications for the exercise of discretion under 
section . . . 212(d)(3),” and provides that an “application for 
the exercise of discretion under section 212(d)(3)(B)3 of the 
                                              
3 It appears that the DOJ immigration regulations have not 
been updated to reflect the 2005 relocation of the relevant 
provision from § 212(d)(3)(B) to § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.  See supra note 2.  The full 
subsection (b) of the DOJ regulation is as follows: 
 
(b) Applications under section 212(d)(3)(B).  
An application for the exercise of discretion 
under section 212(d)(3)(B) of the Act shall be 
submitted on Form I–192 to the district director 
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in charge of the applicant’s intended port of 
entry prior to the applicant’s arrival in the 
United States.  (For Department of State 
procedure when a visa is required, see 22 CFR 
41.95 and paragraph (a) of this section.)  If the 
application is made because the applicant may 
be inadmissible due to present or past 
membership in or affiliation with any 
Communist or other totalitarian party or 
organization, there shall be attached to the 
application a written statement of the history of 
the applicant’s membership or affiliation, 
including the period of such membership or 
affiliation, whether the applicant held any office 
in the organization, and whether his 
membership or affiliation was voluntary or 
involuntary.  If the applicant alleges that his 
membership or affiliation was involuntary, the 
statement shall include the basis for that 
allegation.  When the application is made 
because the applicant may be inadmissible due 
to disease, mental or physical defect, or 
disability of any kind, the application shall 
describe the disease, defect, or disability.  If the 
purpose of seeking admission to the United 
States is for treatment, there shall be attached to 
the application statements in writing to establish 
that satisfactory treatment cannot be obtained 
outside the United States; that arrangements 
have been completed for treatment, and where 
and from whom treatment will be received; 
what financial arrangements for payment of 
expenses incurred in connection with the 
treatment have been made, and that a bond will 
be available if required.  When the application 
is made because the applicant may be 
inadmissible due to the conviction of one or 
more crimes, the designation of each crime, the 
date and place of its commission and of the 
conviction thereof, and the sentence or other 
judgment of the court shall be stated in the 
application; in such a case the application shall 
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Act shall be submitted on Form I–192 to the district director 
[again, who is part of DHS] in charge of the applicant’s 
intended port of entry prior to the applicant’s arrival in the 
United States.”  8 C.F.R. § 1212.4(b) (emphasis added).  If an 
alien’s admissibility is not clear, the district director also has 
the discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1235.2 to defer inspection to a 
later date.  This latter regulation, entitled, “Parole for deferred 
inspection,” provides that “[r]efusal of a district director . . . 
to grant an application for the benefits of . . . section 
212(d)(3) or (4) of the Act, shall be without prejudice to the 
                                                                                                     
be supplemented by the official record of each 
conviction, and any other documents relating to 
commutation of sentence, parole, probation, or 
pardon.  If the application is made at the time of 
the applicant’s arrival to the district director at a 
port of entry, the applicant shall establish that 
he was not aware of the ground of 
inadmissibility and that it could not have been 
ascertained by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, and he shall be in possession of a 
passport and visa, if required, or have been 
granted a waiver thereof.  The applicant shall be 
notified of the decision and if the application is 
denied of the reasons therefor and of his right to 
appeal to the Board within 15 days after the 
mailing of the notification of decision in 
accordance with the Provisions of part 1003 of 
this chapter.  If denied, the denial shall be 
without prejudice to renewal of the application 
in the course of proceedings before a special 
inquiry officer under sections 235 and 236 of 
the Act and this chapter.  When an appeal may 
not be taken from a decision of a special inquiry 
officer excluding an alien but the alien has 
applied for the exercise of discretion under 
section 212(d)(3)(B) of the Act, the alien may 
appeal to the Board from a denial of such 
application in accordance with the provisions 
of § 236.5(b) of this chapter.  
 
8 C.F.R. § 1212.4(b). 
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renewal of such application or the authorizing of such 
admission by the immigration judge without additional 
fee.”  8 C.F.R. § 1235.2(d).  Together, these regulations 
indicate that IJs may only consider those § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) 
waiver requests first made to a district director prior to 
arrival.    
 
Sunday argues that DOJ regulation § 1235.2(d) “in no 
way limits the authority of [IJs], nor does it even discuss the 
jurisdiction of [IJs] generally.”  Sunday Supp. Br. 6.  We 
disagree.  The regulation refers to waiver application 
“renewal” to, and “authorizing” by, the IJ “without additional 
fee.”  This language describes consideration by the IJ only 
after an application has previously been submitted to the 
district director and the fee paid (or waived).       
 
 Even if we determined that the statutory waiver 
provision or implementing regulations were ambiguous, we 
would defer to the BIA’s similar interpretation.  See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984); Soltane v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 148 
(3d Cir. 2004) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)) 
(requiring deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 
regulations unless interpretation is inconsistent with the 
regulation).  In In Matter of Fueyo, an alien procured 
admission into the country through fraud and, once 
discovered, sought a waiver under § 212(d)(3)(B) (which is 
now § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii), see supra note 2).  20 I. & N. Dec. at 
86.  The BIA held that a § 212(d)(3)(B) waiver is unavailable 
to an applicant who “already entered the United States” and is 
currently in deportation proceedings.4  Id.  “By its very 
nature, the relief sought can only confer advance permission 
for a future entry.”  Id. at 87.  Citing the predecessor 
regulation to the DOJ’s current 8 C.F.R. § 1212.4(b),5 the 
                                              
4 The process formerly known as “deportation” is now called 
“removal.”  Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33 
n.1 (2006). 
5 In 2003, after the Fueyo decision, the functions of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred from 
DOJ to DHS.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, § 402, 116 Stat. 2135, 2177-78 (2002).  DOJ 
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BIA recognized that “if an application is denied” for future 
entry, “it may be renewed ‘in the course of proceedings 
before [an immigration judge] under sections 235 and 236 of 
the Act and this chapter.’”6  Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 212.4(b)).  
The BIA has additionally outlined this process as it pertains 
to § 212(d)(4) waivers, which are also governed by DOJ 
regulation § 1235.2(d).  See Matter of Kazemi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 49, 52 (BIA 1984) (holding that IJs “have jurisdiction to 
entertain an application for waiver of inadmissibility under 
section 212(d)(4) of the Act where an alien renews such 
application before an immigration judge in exclusion 
proceedings following its initial denial by the [d]istrict 
[d]irector”). 
 
  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision 
upon which Sunday relies, L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 
(7th Cir. 2014), did not consider DOJ’s regulatory scheme.  
That court previously held that the “clear” statutory language 
renders ineligible for IJ waivers those aliens who have 
“already obtained admission.”  Borrego, 539 F.3d at 692.  In 
Borrego, the waiver applicant had been admitted to the 
United States based on fraud.  Id. at 690.  After her fraud was 
discovered and removal proceedings commenced, the IJ and 
the BIA determined that she was not eligible for a waiver of 
inadmissibility under § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii).  The Court of 
Appeals in Borrego agreed, citing Fueyo and acknowledging 
                                                                                                     
retained certain immigration functions, and the applicable 
regulations were separated into DHS and DOJ counterparts.  
Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; Reorganization 
of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824, 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003); 
Matter of Sesay, 25 I. & N. Dec. 431, 432 n.1 (BIA 2011). 
6 Sections 235 and 236 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act dealt with exclusion proceedings.  Those provisions have 
since been deleted from the statute, see Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579 (1996), and replaced 
with removal provisions 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, see In re 
N-B-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 590, 591 n.1 (BIA 1999).  The 
references to §§ 235 and 236 nonetheless remain in both the 
DHS and DOJ regulations.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.4(b), 
1212.4(b).   
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that “[t]he statute speaks in terms of a waiver applicant who is 
‘seeking admission,’ not one who is already admitted.”  Id. at 
692. 
 
 In L.D.G., however, that court distanced itself from the 
Borrego holding.  L.D.G. entered the United States illegally 
and was placed in removal proceedings.  L.D.G., 744 F.3d at 
1026-27.  She unsuccessfully pursued a waiver of 
inadmissibility from USCIS.  Id.  L.D.G. then turned to the IJ 
for a waiver, but both the IJ and the BIA concluded — the 
latter relying on Borrego — that the IJ lacked authority to 
issue the waiver.  Id. at 1027.  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed, reasoning that Borrego sought a waiver of 
inadmissibility to cure her fraudulent admission retroactively, 
whereas L.D.G. pursued “forward-looking” relief in the form 
of a “new U visa,” which the court held was permissible.  Id. 
at 1028.   
 
 The L.D.G. decision does not alter our conclusion.  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not account 
for the limitations DOJ immigration regulations 8 C.F.R. § 
1212.4(b) and § 1235.2(d) place on IJs’ waiver authority.  We 
agree with the Borrego holding that § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act unambiguously limits the 
Attorney General’s authority to issue waivers of 
inadmissibility to those aliens “seeking admission.”  We also 
conclude that DOJ’s immigration regulations further restrict 
an IJ’s § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) waiver authority to only those 
instances where the alien has applied to a district director 
prior to entry.   
 
Sunday was previously admitted into the United States 
and overstayed.  He therefore cannot seek a waiver of 
inadmissibility from an IJ under § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii).  The BIA, 
therefore, correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction.  It is worth 
reiterating that this result does not deny Sunday the 
opportunity to obtain a waiver of inadmissibility altogether — 
his application should be directed to a different government 
agency, DHS.   
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B. 
 
 Sunday also asserts that his removal violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due 
process because removal is an excessive punishment 
compared to his conduct and the length of his residence in the 
United States.7  He argues, under both constitutional 
provisions, for a proportionality analysis that he ascribes to 
Supreme Court decisions such as State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003).  In State Farm, the Court considered three guideposts 
in order to determine if a civil punitive damages award was 
unconstitutionally excessive under the Fifth Amendment:  
“(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential 
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages 
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases.”  Id. at 418.   
 
 We need not apply the State Farm test because the 
Supreme Court has also consistently held that removal is not 
a punishment for constitutional purposes.  Indeed, the Court 
has indicated that “[t]he purpose of deportation is not to 
punish past transgressions but rather to put an end to a 
continuing violation of the immigration laws.”  I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984); see also 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668 (1977) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment [is] inapplicable to the deportation of aliens on 
the ground that ‘deportation is not a punishment for crime.’” 
(quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 
(1893))); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 
(1952) (“‘[N]or is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a 
refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not 
want.’” (quoting Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 
                                              
7 The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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(1913))).  We have cited the Fong Yue Ting decision in 
concluding that the “argument that [deportation] is cruel and 
unusual punishment has been resoundingly rejected.”  Brea-
Garcia v. I.N.S., 531 F.2d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
 Contrary to Sunday’s arguments, the Supreme Court 
has not reversed its longstanding precedents regarding this 
issue.  Sunday points to Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 
(1958), where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
“forbids Congress to punish by taking away citizenship,” as 
an indication that removal is punishment as well.  However, 
that opinion specifically recognized that “[w]hile deportation 
is undoubtedly a harsh sanction that has a severe penal effect, 
this Court has in the past sustained deportation as an exercise 
of the sovereign’s power to determine the conditions upon 
which an alien may reside in this country.”  Id. at 98.  The 
Court concluded that its “view of deportation . . . [was] 
wholly inapplicable to [Trop’s] case,” which involved 
denaturalization imposed as a punishment.  Id.   
 
  Nor did the Supreme Court’s reference to the 
“‘penalty’” of removal in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740), in 
dicta, change the rule.  The Court held there that Padilla’s 
attorney should have advised Padilla that pleading guilty to 
drug distribution would result in removal.  Id. at 360.  The 
Court described how removal may be a “penalty,” but that “it 
is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.”  Id. at 365.  As 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has correctly 
articulated about the Padilla decision,    
 
the mere fact that the Court in Padilla held that 
a criminal defendant must be adequately 
advised about the immigration consequences of 
a guilty plea does not similarly indicate that the 
consequence is a punitive, criminal one that 
may not be imposed unless it is a proportional 
sanction relative to the underlying criminal 
offense. 
 
Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir. 2015).   
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 We have held similarly, also post-Padilla.  In Eid v. 
Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2014), Eid underwent 
removal proceedings and his citizen spouse filed a Petition for 
Alien Relative, which the BIA denied.  Eid challenged the 
denial under, among other things, the Eighth Amendment, but 
we concluded that “removal cannot violate the Eighth 
Amendment because it is not a criminal punishment.”  Id. at 
126.  Sunday does not distinguish this case, except to 
highlight that there was no final removal order at issue in Eid.  
That, however, is irrelevant.  See id. at 125-26 (“Even 
accepting the Eids’ contention that the denial of the Petition 
would necessarily result in removal, we are unpersuaded [by 
the Eighth Amendment argument].”). 
 
Because both the Supreme Court and this Court 
have made clear that removal is not a punishment, 
Sunday’s Eighth Amendment claim fails.8   
 
 Sunday’s argument under the Fifth Amendment for 
“substantive limits on penalties or punishments” like removal, 
Sunday Br. 37, lacks merit for the same reason.  See State 
Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (holding that Fifth Amendment limits 
excessive civil punitive damages awards, which “serve the 
same purposes as criminal penalties” (emphasis added)).  Nor 
has Sunday cited, and we are not aware of, any case 
extending the Supreme Court’s analysis in State Farm to 
removal proceedings.  That is unsurprising given that due 
process limitations on punitive damages awards are motivated 
by the notion “that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the 
severity of the penalty.”  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 574 (1996).  Removal, of course, is a binary 
                                              
8 Other Courts of Appeals agree with our conclusion.  See, 
e.g., Hinds, 790 F.3d at 261 (holding that removal is not 
punishment and that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable); 
Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005) (same); 
Cadet v. Bluger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(same); Flores-Leon v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 
2001) (same); Briseno v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (same); Santelises v. I.N.S., 491 F.2d 1254, 1255 
(2d Cir. 1974) (same). 
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determination — its severity does not vary like that of a 
damages award.  We hold that Sunday’s Fifth Amendment 
rights were not violated.    
 
IV. 
 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act does not grant 
the Attorney General the authority to issue Sunday a waiver 
of inadmissibility.  Nor does Sunday’s removal constitute 
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.  We will 
deny Sunday’s petition. 
   
 
